When consumers make mistakes, the government may wish to use paternalistic taxation as a corrective measure. We examine a country whose government attempts to use taxation to reduce the consumption of a harmful good, and analyse the extent to which cross-border shopping and tax competition undermine the feasibility of paternalistic taxation. We show that the paternalistic component of a tax on a harmful good is reduced due to the possibility of crossborder shopping, but it does not disappear altogether. In a model with tax competition between two countries, only one of which has a paternalistic objective, we show that there exists an asymmetric Nash equilibrium, where the paternalistic country has the higher tax rate on the harmful good. We further show that despite the divergence in policy objectives, a minimum tax rate requirement can be Pareto improving. Tax harmonisation on the other hand always reduces welfare in the low-tax country.
Introduction
When the government's and consumers'preferences di¤er, the government may wish to in ‡uence consumer choice through public policy. One particular example is a situation where consumers do not fully take into account the future negative e¤ects caused by the consumption of certain goods, and therefore consume too much of such goods, even from the point of view of maximising their own lifetime utility. An important example is excessive consumption of goods with negative health e¤ects (such as unhealthy food, cigarettes and alcohol) by consumers with self-control problems. It can be argued that market solutions to such self-control problems are unlikely to be e¤ective (see Köszegi (2005) ), and taxation is a potential tool for correcting the distortion in consumption. Taxation in such a context has been considered for example by O' Donoghue and Rabin (2003; and Gruber and Köszegi (2004) . In general, policies of this kind are an example of paternalism, and their alleged purpose is to protect individuals in cases where they act against their own best self interest. Accordingly, we use the term "paternalistic taxation" to refer to taxation that is implemented so as to move private consumption closer to its optimal level (as evaluated according to the government's preferences) 1 .
The objective of this paper is to analyse the feasibility of implementing paternalistic taxation in the presence of cross-border shopping and commodity tax competition. As is well known from previous literature, commodity tax competition between neighbouring countries can have the negative e¤ect of eroding a country's tax base, when consumers take advantage of the opportunity of making cheaper purchases abroad. When governments wish to pursue paternalistic policies, tax competition causes a further externality which has thus far not been analysed in the literature: the possibility of cross-border shopping may undermine a government's attempts to control harmful consumption by relatively high taxation at home.
An interesting example is provided by recent developments in the Nordic countries. The excise duty on spirits was reduced by 45% in Denmark in October 2003. This change was at least in part prompted by relatively low prices of alcohol in Germany, and the desire to curtail cross-border shopping. Similarly, alcohol taxes were reduced in Finland on average by 33% in 2004, as a response to the lower alcohol taxes and prices in central Europe and in Estonia. A major motivation was that due to the removal of restrictions on alcohol purchases from Estonia, high taxes on alcohol were expected to become an ine¢ cient tool for controlling alcohol consumption in Finland. In response to the new Danish and Finnish policies, also Sweden has been under considerable pressure to lower its taxes on alcohol, which are currently among the highest in the EU (European Commission, 2004 ).
In the current paper, we …rst consider a country whose government wishes to use taxation to reduce the consumption of a harmful good when consumers have an option to purchase the good more cheaply abroad. In this analysis we take the foreign price as exogenous. We show that the paternalistic component of the tax is reduced due to the possibility of cross-border shopping, but it does not disappear altogether. The intuition is that cross-border shopping causes taxes to be a less e¤ective means for controlling harmful consumption, but not completely so: due to transportation costs, the increase in purchases made abroad caused by a domestic tax increase is smaller than the corresponding reduction in domestic purchases. Hence taxation can still be used to lower total consumption, albeit to a lesser extent than in the absence of cross-border shopping.
In addition to analysing how cross-border shopping a¤ects the optimal tax on a harmful good when foreign prices can be taken as exogenous, we examine the implications of tax competition. We assume that consumer preferences are identical in the two countries, but one of the governments wishes to pursue paternalistic taxation whereas the other does not. Building on the model of Hau ‡er (1996) , we show that in this case an asymmetric Nash equilibrium exists, where the paternalistic country has a higher tax rate on the harmful good than the other country.
We further analyse whether policy coordination in the form of minimum tax rates or tax harmonisation can be used to alleviate problems arising from tax competition in this context. We show that the welfare e¤ect of a binding minimum tax requirement on the low-tax country is in general ambiguous. However, a stronger paternalistic concern makes it more likely that the policy is Pareto improving. Our results indicate that for quadratic transport costs, the welfare e¤ect on the high-tax country is unambiguously positive, and we show that there are relevant conditions under which the policy is bene…cial also for the low-tax country. The two countries can both therefore bene…t from a minimum tax rate requirement, despite the divergence in policy objectives. Tax rate harmonisation, on the other hand, is shown always to harm the low-tax country.
As a practical example of coordination in setting tax rates on harmful goods, the EU has minimum rates for excise duties on most types of alcohol. These were binding on a number of member states when the policy was adopted in 1992, but do not seem to be so anymore. Accordingly, the European Commission has recommended an in ‡ation adjustment of the minimum rates, but no further harmonisation is planned due to the di¤erences in views on alcohol taxation between the member states. (European Commission, 2004) .
2 However, the proposed adjustment to the minimum rates has recently faced opposition from some member countries that would be a¤ected by the reform. Regarding the excise duty on tobacco products, a tightening of the EU minimum rate requirements was introduced in 2002, along with measures that lead to greater harmonisation in the rates. Health concerns are speci…cally mentioned as a motivation for the tightening of the minimum rates. (Directive 2002/10/EC; European Commission, 2001 ).
Our paper is closely related to previous literature on commodity tax competition 3 , and in particular to the paper by Hau ‡er (1996) . Hau ‡er considers commodity tax competition in a setting where governments of the two countries di¤er in their valuation for public goods. As in his model, we assume that producer trade is taxed under the destination principle (that is, taxes on the traded goods are levied in the destination country), whereas origin-based taxation is applied to cross-border purchases by consumers. Such a mixed tax system is currently in place in the EU (as a result of the abolition of border controls for consumer purchases), and the framework is therefore particularly well suited to analyse the issues that we are interested in. Hau ‡er's paper also extends the earlier analysis of Kanbur and Keen (1993) by allowing governments to care not only about tax revenue but also about private consumption. Our paper di¤ers from Hau ‡er's analysis in that we allow the government's preferences to di¤er from those of consumers in one of the countries. Therefore, even though the government takes consumer surplus into account, increases in consumption are not always bene…cial for social welfare. As was explained above, tax competition then has the further negative e¤ect of undermining the government's ability to control harmful consumption. Our analysis has particular similarities also with the analysis of commodity tax competition in the presence of externalities: negative health e¤ects (in the case of consumers with self-control problems) as well as negative externalities are both harmful e¤ects not taken into account by consumers, and governments might wish to alleviate these e¤ects through taxation. Most of the literature on environmental taxation in an international context has however concentrated on the analysis of cross-border environmental externalities (see for example Cremer and Gahvari (2005) and Aronsson and Blomquist (2003) and the references therein). In our context, the negative e¤ects of consumption are local in the sense that they accrue only on the country whose consumers consume the harmful good. Further, when the issue is whether the government should adopt a paternalistic policy or not (rather than whether the government should engage in pollution abatement), it is perhaps more plausible to assume that governments of otherwise identical countries may have di¤erent policy objectives. Cooperation may thus be more di¢ cult to achieve in our context than in the case of (global) environmental externalities. 4 Christiansen (2003, 2006) analyses optimal commodity taxation in the presence of local externalities and cross-border shopping. Aronsson and Sjögren (2005) consider the particular problem of alcohol taxation when the local externalities of alcohol consumption are taken into account, and consumers can avoid domestic taxes either through cross-border shopping or illegal production. The focus in these papers is however distinctly di¤erent from ours, and they do not consider tax competition explicitly.
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the model. In Section 3, we analyse paternalistic taxation when consumers can go cross-border shopping in a neighbouring country with an exogenously given, lower tax rate. In Section 4, we analyse the equilibrium with tax competition. In Sections 5 and 6 we consider the welfare e¤ects of two coordination measures, a minimum tax rate requirement and tax harmonisation. Section 7 concludes.
The Model
We use a partial equilibrium model of cross-border shopping between two countries, A and B. Each country has a representative consumer who derives utility from consuming a good (c) that can be purchased either in the home country or abroad. Total consumption of this good by the citizen of country i, i = A; B, is denoted by c i , which is the sum of the amount purchased at home (c 4 There is also literature on competition in setting environmental standards and capital taxation in the presence of local environmental externalities and capital mobility -see for example Oates and Schwab (1988) and Wilson (1996) . 5 Another related paper is Haaparanta (2006) , who examines multilateral tari¤ reforms in the presence of merit goods. 6 As we are primarily interested in trade in goods such as alcohol, concentrating on a single homoge-If the good is purchased abroad, the consumer in country i incurs a transportation cost c i j . As in previous literature, the transportation cost function is assumed to be continuously di¤erentiable and to have the following properties:
We therefore assume for simplicity that the transport cost functions are the same in both countries 7 .
We assume that producer trade is taxed under the destination principle (that is, taxes on the traded goods are levied in the destination country). Under such a tax system, producer arbitrage equalises producer prices in the two countries, and we normalise these prices to 1. Consumer prices are denoted by q i = 1 + t i and we assume that in the case of consumer trade, taxes are levied under the origin principle, so that consumers pay taxes in the country where they purchase the good. Consequently, if t i > t j ; consumers in country i purchase part of their consumption in country j, until the point where
We refer to this condition as the consumer arbitrage condition.
As in Hau ‡er (1996), we distinguish between two di¤erent "regimes" according to whether country i has a higher tax rate than the other country. We thus refer to the high-tax country as being in regime I and to the low-tax country as being in regime II. This distinction is crucial in the model of tax competition, since a part of the tax revenues created by the consumption of the citizens of the high-tax country accrue on the low-tax country. If a country is in regime I, the budget constraint of its citizen is given by (1 + t i ) c 
which can be thought of as the income saved by the citizens of the high-tax country due to the possibility of cross-border shopping (i.e. due to buying the quantity c i j abroad rather than at home). Further,
The regime-speci…c budget constraints can then be rewritten as
for regime I, and b i = B i for regime II.
The consumer's utility function is u (c i ), and this is maximised subject to the regime-speci…c budget constraint. This maximisation yields the regime-speci…c (total) demand functions c
, as well as the indirect utility functions nous good seems appropriate. Tax competition with trade in di¤erentiated goods has been analyzed for example in Lockwood (2001) . See also Christiansen (2003 Christiansen ( , 2006 for analyses where some goods are cross-border traded while others are only purchased at home. 7 This assumption is a su¢ cient condition for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the tax setting game we set out below. Hau ‡er (1996) has shown (in a model without paternalism) that this type of a game has a Nash equilibrium if the second derivatives of the transport cost functions are equal in the two countries.
As in Hau ‡er (1996) , the comparative statics of the consumption levels with respect to each of the tax rates (or equivalently, consumer prices) are completely determined by the consumer arbitrage condition and regime-speci…c budget constraints. They are given by the following expressions:
We allow the government's valuation of private consumption to di¤er from the citizen's valuation: speci…cally, we assume that the government values consumption according to Our choice of u(c i ) implies that private consumption is excessive from the government's point of view. There is then scope for paternalism in policy making: the government can aim to in ‡uence private consumption decisions towards its favoured outcome through its choice of the tax rate. Total social welfare is taken to be the sum of the utility from private consumption and from public funds. Let denote the marginal social value of tax revenue from the tax on the cross-border traded good (or the marginal cost of raising revenue from other tax bases).
10 Using the notation v(:) = v (:) h(:); the government therefore chooses 8 Racionero (2001) uses a similar functional form to examine optimal taxation in the presence of merit goods.
9 To see this, assume that consumption has delayed utility costs equal to h c i that accrue in the period following consumption, and let h(c i ) = (1 ) h c i ;where is the standard exponential discount factor. This formulation then captures the case where the government wants to maximise the lifetime utility of an individual who uses a quasi-hyperbolic discount function with parameter (see for example Laibson (1997) ). 10 We use a partial equilibrium set-up where demands for other goods are assumed to be independent of the demand for the good under consideration and consequently, other tax bases are una¤ected by the taxes in question. A similar assumption is (often implicitly) made in most of the cross-border shopping literature. It is therefore also natural to assume that is constant with respect to t i , as for example in Christiansen (1994) . the tax rate to maximise
if it is in regime I. In regime II, the total welfare function to be maximised is
3 Paternalistic taxation with cross-border shopping 3.1 Closed-economy benchmark
As a benchmark, let us …rst consider the policy that would be chosen by the government of a country (say country A) with a paternalistic objective, when there is no cross-border shopping. The government's objective function is then given by
Denoting the consumer's marginal utility of income by , the …rst-order condition is
The optimal tax is given implicitly by the rule
where
c A is the elasticity of demand. The …rst term in this expression re‡ects paternalistic concerns and it enters the optimal tax formula additively, in accordance with the additivity principle familiar from the context of environmental taxation (Sandmo 1975) . Since h 0 (c A ) > 0, this term is positive and if the harm function is convex, it is the larger the higher is consumption (and therefore, the further away equilibrium consumption is from optimal consumption). Paternalistic concerns therefore lead to higher taxation, as expected. The second term in (3) re ‡ects the standard public …nance argument for taxation, and indicates that the magnitude of the tax depends on how sensitive demand is to price changes. The role of the term 1 = merits some discussion, as it appears several times in the analysis. The parameter is the marginal utility of income, is the shadow price of tax revenues, and = is therefore the inverse of the shadow cost of public funds.
When taxation is distortive, we know that 1 = > 0: However, in the case of paternalistic taxation, taxes have also a corrective role and it is not clear a priori, whether = is larger or smaller than unity. The di¤erence between the paternalistic and standard cases is clear from (2): in the absence of paternalism, the …rst-order condition implies that 1 = > 0; but when the government has a paternalistic objective, the sign of 1 = is in general ambiguous. In what follows we assume that taxation is distortive -that is, at the optimum, taxation is used in excess of what would be required to correct the distortion in the consumption of the harmful good. This seems to be a reasonable assumption, since it is unlikely that a corrective tax on tobacco, say, will be su¢ cient to satisfy a modern government's revenue requirement. We therefore assume throughout the paper that 1 = > 0: Consequently, we can also note that in the presence of distortionary taxation, the paternalistic part of the tax is lower than in the …rst-best case where taxation is not distortionary. In the …rst-best situation, the optimal tax would be given by
This result is analogous to the principle of incomplete internalisation of environmental externalities in the presence of distortive taxation (Bovenberg and de Mooij 1994) , and it can be explained by the fact that the marginal costs of harm reduction increase with the marginal cost of public funds.
The e¤ect of cross-border shopping
Let us next consider how the optimal tax is a¤ected when cross-border shopping is possible. Let country A be the home country whose tax decision we are interested in, and assume that there exists a neighbouring country B with a lower, exogenously given level of taxes. Country A is then in regime I: consumers in country A purchase part of their consumption in country B, until the point where
and their consumption is such that the budget constraint b
A is satis…ed.
The government's objective function is now given by W
and the …rst-order condition is c
Rearranging this condition yields the optimal tax rule in the case of cross-border shopping, which is given by
Looking at the public …nance part of the tax rule (the last term), the demand elasticity that is relevant from the public …nance point of view is now the elasticity of domestic demand, since this is the quantity that determines the tax base in the case of cross-border shopping 11 . Using the comparative statics results in (1), it is easy to show that A A > A . Therefore the public …nance part of the tax rule is scaled down due to the increased elasticity of the domestic tax base in the presence of cross-border shopping.
Further, comparing equations (3) and (4), the paternalistic term in the tax rule is multiplied by
: in the presence of cross-border shopping, the paternalistic component of the tax is increasing in the ratio of the elasticity of total demand to the elasticity of domestic demand. This …nding has an intuitive explanation: since the harmfulness of consumption is determined by total demand, this ratio of elasticities describes the e¤ectiveness of tax policy as a means of reducing harmful consumption in an open economy.
Recalling that c
, we can derive another useful formulation of the optimal tax rule, which enables us to evaluate the magnitude of the multiplier on the paternalistic term. Equation (4) can be written as The intuition for this result is that taxation has now become a less e¢ cient means for controlling harmful consumption, since the bene…t from harm-abatement must now be traded o¤ against inducing costly crossborder shopping. However, it is interesting to note that the paternalistic component is not reduced to zero, and paternalistic concerns therefore continue to play a role in optimal tax policy even with cross-border shopping. It is worth stressing that this result does not depend for example on the strength of the paternalistic objective, or on the magnitude of transport costs.
The intuition for the result that paternalism continues to play a role in tax policy despite cross-border shopping is the following: even if there is extensive cross-border shopping, changes in the domestic tax rate cause larger changes in domestic demand (c A A ) than in the amount of cross-border shopping (c A B ) (see (1)); this is because transport costs imply that cross-border shopping is an imperfect substitute for domestic 12 It should be noted that the discussion in this section su¤ers from the common problem that the "scaling down" refers to the components of the (implicit) tax rule, and not necessarily to the level of taxes when the economy moves between the two di¤erent equilibria considered. Limitations of this type are very common in the optimal taxation literature, and have recently been discussed for example by Gaube (2005). consumption. Increases in the domestic tax rate will therefore reduce overall consumption regardless of the level of transport costs. As the level of total consumption determines the amount of harm from consumption, a paternalistic consideration will always be present in the optimal tax formula. The magnitude of the adjustment to the paternalistic component of the optimal commodity tax does, however, depend on the shape of the transport cost function: ! 0 when 00 ! 1. Therefore, as expected, the paternalistic part of the tax is high when transport costs are highly convex, and low when transport costs are close to linear (and cross-border shopping is therefore more sensitive to changes in the domestic tax rate).
Our results on how cross-border shopping a¤ects paternalistic commodity taxation are summarised in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Assume that a government wishes to use paternalistic taxation to affect the consumption of a commodity. When this commodity is subject to cross-border shopping, the paternalistic component of the tax on the commodity is scaled down, but it is not reduced to zero. The paternalistic component of the tax is the higher the more elastic total demand is relative to domestic demand:
4 Tax competition
Existence of a symmetric equilibrium
Let us next analyse the equilibrium under tax competition in a symmetric setting. In addition to assuming that individuals in the two countries have the same preferences, in the following analysis we will further assume that incomes in the two countries are identical
In the current subsection we further assume that the two government's have identical preferences; this assumption will subsequently be relaxed. As a …rst step, we need to derive the reaction function of country i, taking into account that it can in principle be either the high-tax or the low-tax country, depending on the policy chosen by its neighbour. As in Hau ‡er (1996), we therefore …rst derive separate reaction functions for the cases where the country is in either regime, taking into account that in regime I, the tax rate of country i has to be at least as high as the tax rate of country j, and vice versa in regime II. We then show that the reaction function is continuous at the point where the country switches regime (that is, at the point t i = t j ). This guarantees the existence of equilibrium in the tax setting game 13 . 13 The second-order conditions are reported in the appendix.
The …rst-order conditions for the government's optimisation problem in the two regimes are given by R I :
R II :
Substituting in the expressions for the partial derivatives in (6) and (7), we obtain R I :
The above equations de…ne the reaction function t i (t j ) of country i. Since c 
Asymmetric equilibrium when one country has a paternalistic objective
Consider as a starting point a symmetric case where neither country has a paternalistic objective. In this case, the term h 0 (c i ) @c i @q i in the above reaction functions is zero for both countries and there is a symmetric equilibrium. Now consider a change where in one of the countries, say in country A, a government with a paternalistic objective comes into power, whereas in the other country the situation remains unchanged. We know from equation (5), that this causes an increase in the tax rate in country A (corresponding to an outward shift in country A's reaction function).
In order to determine what happens in country B, we need to analyse the slope of its reaction function. Country B is now in regime II and has no paternalistic objective, and its reaction function is therefore given by
Totally di¤erentiating (10), the slope of country B's reaction function is given by
2 : The denominator of this expression is the second-order condition for country B, and is therefore negative. The numerator is given by
This expression is simpli…ed by assuming that the total transport cost function is quadratic, which is a common simplifying assumption in the literature on commodity tax competition (see for example Kanbur and Keen (1993) and Hau ‡er (1996, 2001) ). We therefore assume from now on that the transport cost function is = 1=2 c dt A > 0:Therefore, the two tax rates are strategic complements from the point of view of country B, and the policy shift in country A causes country B's tax rate also to increase.
To determine the relative magnitude of the increase in country B's tax rate, we substitute the comparative statics results from (1), as well as the transport cost function into the expression for dt B dt A : After some manipulations, we obtain
Since we have assumed that 1 = > 0, this expression is smaller than 1 (in fact, smaller than 1=2). Therefore the tax rate in country B increases by less than the tax rate in country A.
14 Therefore, there exists an asymmetric Nash equilibrium, where the paternalistic country has the higher tax rate. We can state the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Starting from a symmetric equilibrium where neither government has a paternalistic objective, consider a small change whereby one country adopts paternalistic taxation to reduce the consumption of a harmful good. Both countries' tax rates 14 The original equilibrium therefore satis…es the "stability" conditions of Nash equilibrium (see Dixit (1986) ), which are equivalent with
increase, and there is an asymmetric equilibrium where the paternalistic country has the higher tax rate.
Minimum tax rates
Let us next turn to the question whether policy coordination can be bene…cial when the starting point is the equilibrium examined in the previous section. In the current section, we examine whether welfare can be increased by setting a binding minimum tax rate requirement. In the following section, we will analyse the e¤ects of tax rate harmonisation. Both are key measures that have been proposed in the EU to curtail excessive cross-border shopping.
Welfare e¤ect on the high-tax country
In order to examine whether a binding minimum tax rate requirement on the low-tax country would improve welfare in the high-tax country, we di¤erentiate the welfare function of country A with respect to country B's tax rate. As country A is in regime I and has a paternalistic objective, its welfare function is
The derivative with respect to country B's tax rate is given by
From this expression, we can isolate two e¤ects, identi…ed in previous literature (see Mintz and Tulkens (1986) and Hau ‡er (1996)), of an increase in the low-tax country's tax rate on the high-tax country's welfare: …rstly, the private consumption e¤ect, which is given by the two …rst terms in (12), is the direct welfare e¤ect of the reduction in private consumption, caused by the increased cost of cross-border shopping. Secondly, the public consumption e¤ect, given by the last term in (12), gives the e¤ect of the increase in the low-tax country's tax rate on government revenue in the high-tax country 15 .
Consider …rst the private consumption e¤ect. The nature of this e¤ect is in our context very di¤erent from the standard case: in our setting, high consumption is not necessarily bene…cial for welfare, and a tax increase in the low-tax country therefore generates a positive spillover on the high-tax country not analysed in previous literature. In the standard case without paternalism, the private consumption e¤ect is always negative, and consists only of the very …rst term in (12), c A B : this is a terms of trade e¤ect, as consumers experience a loss due to more expensive cross-border shopping. However, the paternalistic objective implies that the sign of the private consumption e¤ect may be reversed: in the case with paternalism, the reduction in consumption has an additional positive e¤ect (given by the term h 0 (c A )
, as the harm caused by consumption is thereby reduced 16 . In net, the sign of the private consumption e¤ect is thus in our case ambiguous. From (12), it is positive if q
The high-tax country is therefore more likely to bene…t from the tax increase in the low-tax country when the marginal harm created by consumption is high and the paternalistic objective therefore plays a stronger role. The last term in (12) refers to the public consumption e¤ect. This e¤ect is identical to the standard case, as presented in Hau ‡er (1996) . The public consumption e¤ect can be either positive or negative, depending on whether an increase in the low-tax country's tax rate increases or reduces domestic demand. The latter case, which may seem paradoxical, can be explained by the fact that a tax increase in the low-tax country reduces not only cross-border shopping, but also total demand c A due to an income e¤ect. Whether the domestic tax base increases or decreases when the foreign tax rate is increased, depends on how responsive cross-border shopping is to changes in the tax rate di¤erential; this in turn depends on the shape of the transport cost function. Let us again consider the special case of quadratic transport costs. As in Hau ‡er (1996) , the public consumption e¤ect is then unambiguously positive: domestic demand is then given by c
and therefore
q A > 0: However, the ambiguity about the sign of the private consumption e¤ect is not resolved by assuming quadratic transport costs, as it depends primarily on the extent of harm from consumption. Further analysis is therefore needed to determine whether the overall e¤ect in (12) is positive or negative. Noting again that with quadratic These e¤ects however are only present when there is imperfect factor mobility or imperfect competition, respectively, and therefore do not arise in our model. 16 Christiansen (2006) has independently obtained similar results in a context where there are negative externalities from the consumption of a cross-border traded good (see Proposition 4 in his paper). The emphasis in his paper -the e¤ect of cross-border shopping on the optimal commodity tax structure -is distinctly di¤erent from ours. transport costs c A B = q A q B , the expression for
This expression can easily be shown to be positive by comparing it with the high-tax country's …rst-order condition (8). Therefore, if transport costs are quadratic, the sum of the private and public consumption e¤ects is positive, and the paternalistic country bene…ts from a binding minimum tax rate requirement on the low-tax country.
Welfare e¤ect on the low-tax country
Let us next consider the e¤ect of a binding minimum tax rate requirement on welfare in the low-tax country. If the required increase in the tax rate of the low-tax country is small, then the welfare e¤ect of a binding minimum tax rate on the low-tax country itself depends only on the reaction of the high-tax country. We therefore need to examine …rstly, how country B's welfare is a¤ected by changes in country A's tax rate, and secondly, how country A's tax rate reacts to a (small) increase in country B's tax rate.
The e¤ect of a change in country A's tax rate on welfare in country B is given by
an increase in the high-tax country's tax rate would unambiguously increase the amount of cross-border shopping, and it thus only has a positive public consumption e¤ect on the low-tax country. Therefore, if the tax rates are strategic complements also from the point of view of country A, and an increase in country B's own tax rate therefore induces country A also to increase its tax rate, then the minimum tax rate requirement increases welfare in country B.
To examine how country A's tax rate reacts to an increase in country B's tax rate, we need to …nd the slope of country A's reaction function. Country A is in regime I and has a paternalistic objective, and its reaction function (from (8)) is therefore given by
By a similar argument as in the previous section, sign
: Differentiating (13) yields
The sign of this expression is in general ambiguous. We can however again analyse the special case of quadratic transport costs. In this case we know that @c A A @q B > 0: It can also be observed from country A's …rst-order condition (13) that
With quadratic transport costs, the …rst half of (14) therefore remains ambiguous even with quadratic transport costs, and it is guaranteed to be positive only if the harm function is not too convex. When the harm function is very convex, the reduction in consumption caused by higher taxation in country B already causes a large reduction in harm, and the case for domestic tax increases in country A is therefore weakened.
It is interesting to note that with quadratic transport costs, a stronger paternalistic concern in country A makes it more likely that (14) is positive: the stronger the paternalistic concern, the more likely it is that country A increases its tax rate in response to a tax increase in country B. In the previous subsection we concluded that a stronger paternalistic concern also makes it more likely that the high-tax country bene…ts from the minimum tax rate requirement. Therefore, a stronger paternalistic concern -implying that there is more divergence in the policy objectives of the two countries -makes it more likely that a binding minimum tax rate on the low-tax country is Pareto improving.
Further, if we consider the example of alcohol, recent medical research has provided evidence that the harm function from alcohol consumption may in fact be linear (Johansen et al 2005) . If this is the case, the last term in (14) vanishes, and a policy of minimum tax rate requirement will be Pareto improving.
We summarise the results of this section in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Starting from a symmetric equilibrium where neither government has a paternalistic objective, consider a small change whereby one country adopts paternalistic taxation to reduce the consumption of a harmful good. In the resulting asymmetric equilibrium, the welfare e¤ect of a binding minimum tax rate requirement is in general ambiguous. With quadratic transport costs, the following results hold: (i) the welfare e¤ect on the high-tax country is positive.
(ii) the welfare e¤ect on the low-tax country is positive if the harm function is not too convex.
(iii) a stronger paternalistic objective makes it more likely that the policy is Pareto improving.
Our analysis has therefore shown that even when countries have very di¤erent views about the proper role of alcohol taxation -whether it should be used for revenue raising purposes only, or as part of national health policy -they can bene…t from policy coordination. The di¤erent views about alcohol taxation held for example by di¤erent member states of the EU should therefore not be an obstacle to policy coordination aimed at eliminating harmful tax competition.
Tax harmonisation
Let us …nally analyse another possible coordination measure which has been discussed by European policy makers, namely tax rate harmonisation. Our argument in this section is most closely related to the analysis of tax harmonisation in Kanbur and Keen (1993) . However, Kanbur and Keen as well as various authors building on their analysis (see Nielsen (2001) and Ohsawa (1999) ) assume that the governments'objective is to maximise tax revenue. We analyse also the e¤ects on private consumption, taking into account the fact that in our context, increases in private consumption are not always welfare improving 17 .
As in previous literature, we take harmonisation to mean that taxes in the two countries are set at a common, intermediate level between the initial tax rates. Such a reform eliminates all cross-border shopping, and might therefore at …rst sight seem like an attractive remedy for the problems stemming from cross-border shopping and tax competition. However, it is easy to show that in our model the low-tax country would lose from harmonisation to any tax rate t 2 t B ; t Keen (1987 Keen ( , 1989 for seminal contributions to the literature on tax harmonisation (looking at destination-based taxes) and Lopez-Garcia (1996) and Kotsogiannis et al (2005) for analyses with origin-based taxation. These papers consider tax harmonisation in a setting with di¤erentiated goods, and do not model cross-border shopping or transport costs explicitly. Lockwood (2001) provides a synthesis of many results from the previous literature, but he does not consider harmonisation of origin-based taxes.
18 As in Kanbur and Keen (1993) , we do not consider the possibility of transfers between countries, but look at each country separately and concentrate on whether actual Pareto improvements could be obtained by harmonisation. loses all tax revenue from cross-border shopping, whereas domestic revenue remains constant, as consumption falls one-for-one with the increased tax rate. Therefore, tax rate harmonisation is certain to reduce welfare in country B.
Turning next to e¤ects in the high-tax country, we can gain useful insights by examining the e¤ects of harmonisation at either of the original tax rates, We know that total private consumption will necessarily fall: consumers were maximising their consumption at the original equilibrium by doing some cross-border shopping, and therefore private consumption must fall in the new situation where there is no cross-border shopping but domestic consumption is as expensive as before. Government revenue, on the other hand, will increase due to an increase in the tax base: using the consumer budget constraint, we know that in the original equilibrium, government revenue is given by
A , whereas in the new situation it is simply
Thus we have established that in the (previously) high-tax country, private consumption falls and government revenue increases after harmonisation at t A . In our context, it is not clear whether reductions in consumption are harmful from the social point of view, due to the harm generated by consumption but not taken into account by consumers -see the previous section, where we argued that the private consumption e¤ect may be either positive or negative in the high-tax country in the original equilibrium. In principle, there would therefore be two cases to consider -the one where consumption is too high in the original equilibrium, and the one where consumption is too low. However, since the government's objective function is not monotonic in the level of consumption, it is not possible to derive unambiguous results for the welfare e¤ect on country A in either of these cases 19 .
As an aside, it is interesting to note that the result in Kanbur and Keen (1993) , that harmonisation to t A (or any tax rate su¢ ciently close to it) would always be welfare improving in the high-tax country, does not seem to be robust -in the conventional setting where increases in consumption are bene…cial -to extending the government's welfare function beyond simple revenue maximisation. When increases in consumption are bene…cial, country A might either bene…t or lose out from harmonisation to t A , depending on the relative weights given to private and public consumption in the social 19 Even in the case where consumption was inititally too high and a marginal reduction in consumption would therefore be bene…cial, we cannot conclude that welfare would be increased by a discrete increase in country B's tax rate from t B to t A ; as consumption in county A might then be reduced too much.
welfare function:
How about the welfare e¤ects in country A of harmonisation at some tax rate t 2 t B ; t A ? Since harmonisation at t B strictly lowers welfare in country A, by continuity, there is another threshold tax ratet 2 t B ; t A below which harmonisation will still certainly be welfare reducing for country A: However, harmonisation abovet will have an ambiguous e¤ect on welfare in country A.
We summarise our …ndings on the welfare e¤ects of tax harmonisation in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 There exists a tax ratet; such that tax harmonisation at any t 2 t B ;t is welfare reducing for both countries. The welfare e¤ect of harmonisation at t 2 t ; t A is negative for country B and ambiguous for country A.
Based on our analysis we can therefore say that even though the two countries with di¤erent policy objectives can bene…t from coordination as shown in Proposition 3, the coordination should be done through minimum tax rate requirements rather than through tax rate harmonisation. Welfare is not reduced by cross-border shopping per se, but by tax rates being too low. The more e¤ective remedy is therefore to implement mandatory increases in tax rates, rather than to eliminate cross-border shopping by tax harmonisation.
Conclusions
In this paper we have analysed how the possibility of using taxation as a tool to control the consumption of a harmful good is a¤ected by cross-border shopping and commodity tax competition. In a context where a paternalistic country has a neighbour with an exogenously given, lower tax rate, we showed that cross-border shopping leads to a reduction of the paternalistic component of the tax on the harmful good: with the possibility of cross-border shopping, domestic taxation is an ine¢ cient instrument for reducing harmful consumption. However, paternalism still continues to play a role in tax policy.
We also analysed explicitly the outcome of tax competition between two countries, one of which has a paternalistic objective whereas the other one does not. In such a situation, the paternalistic country has the higher tax rate. We further examined whether welfare could be improved by policy coordination, and showed that the welfare e¤ects of tax harmonisation would be negative on the low-tax country and ambiguous on the high-tax country.
However, the prospects for welfare gains from minimum tax rate requirements seem more promising. It was shown that in a model with quadratic transport costs, the paternalistic country would bene…t from a small increase in the other country's tax rate. The low-tax country would also bene…t, if the harm function from consumption is not too convex.
Further, it is interesting to note that a stronger paternalistic objective makes it more likely that the policy of a minimum tax rate requirement is Pareto improving: …rstly, the paternalistic country is then more likely to bene…t from the reduction in consumption caused by a higher foreign tax rate; and secondly, the paternalistic country is then more likely to respond to the minimum tax rate requirement by increasing its tax rate in turn, which is bene…cial for the low-tax country as it alleviates the negative externality caused by tax competition.
Our analysis therefore indicates that even countries with very di¤erent attitudes towards paternalism can bene…t from policy coordination. The divergent views about alcohol taxation held for example by di¤erent member states of the EU should therefore not be an obstacle to policy coordination aimed at eliminating harmful tax competition.
Appendix
The second-order condition in the tax competition game for regime I (the high-tax country) is given by The …rst term is negative by (1) and the …rst-order condition (8). The second term is also negative. The third term is non-positive if the harm function is convex or linear, which we have argued to be the most likely case. Finally, the last term is negative for example if the transport cost function is quadratic (this is a su¢ cient, though not a necessary condition).
In the case of regime II (the low-tax country), the second-order condition is given by The …rst term is guaranteed to be negative given our assumption that > and if the tax rate in the low-tax country is less than 100% of the producer price (a su¢ cient but not a necessary condition). As above, the second term is negative if the harm function is convex or linear, and the last term is negative for example if the transport cost function is quadratic (again a su¢ cient but not a necessary condition).
